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    The Chinese economic takeoff has captured the attention of the whole world with its 
15-year sustained growth. It started with the implementation of Deng Xiaoping's 
economic reform policy in 1979. Since then, China has been the world's fastest-growing 
economy. For a country comprising one fifth of the world's population, with an 
exceedingly diverse economy, such rapid growth would have been thought impossible. 
What makes this possible? Has the fast economic growth been translated into human 
development? What accounts for the successful or failing translation? To answer these 
questions, this country report traces for more than four decades the performance of China 
with respect to economic growth and human development, and offers explanations with 
emphasis on interactions between economic growth and human development. The 
structure of this report is as follows: the first section examines the trends of economic 
growth and human development, discusses the growth pattern and nature, and provides 
the findings of mixed performance in terms of the country's translation of economic 
growth into human development. The second section develops an analytical framework to 
explain this mixed performance from the aspects of institutional change, reform policy 
and the quality of governance that concern the exact process through which growth 
translates, or fails to translate, into human development. The third section, by utilizing 
the analytical framework, discusses such empirical issues as income distribution, 
reduction of poverty, education and health, economic security and environmental issues. 
The last one contains a conclusion.  
   
1. The trends of economic growth and human development  
1.1 The rise of China's economy  
    China's economic growth in the past four decades can be divided into two periods: the 
pre-reform era (before 1979) and the post-reform era (after 1979). The year 1979 
represents a milestone in terms of economic performance, development strategy and the 
pattern and nature of growth. The Chinese economy in 1978 was generally pictured as 
"on the brink of disaster" due to its various imbalances as well as problems of low 
productivity growth and poor incentives. The major imbalances included an emphasis on 
capital construction and neglect of agriculture and light industry; emphasis on production 
and neglect of people's livelihood; emphasis on production and neglect of distribution; and emphasis on high accumulation and neglect of efficiency and consumption. These 
imbalances caused high urban unemployment, widespread rural poverty and sluggish 
productivity growth.1  
    Table 1 compares the gross national product (GNP) growth rate and that of the 
population in the 1980s and 1990s with those of earlier periods. Despite the many 
statistical shortcomings, there can be little doubt that the growth rate after reform was 
substantially higher than in the pre-reform period (as a matter of fact, there was a good 
subsequent growth between 1952 and 1980), as Table 1 shown. GNP grew annually at a 
rate of 6.2 per cent in the period of 1952-1980 and 9.6 per cent in the period of 1980-
1993. Except for the early 1950s and the period 1962-65, when the economy was 
recovering from war or famine, at no time in the history of the People's Republic of 
China has the economy grown as fast as in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.2  At 
the same time, population growth has been slower, so that the difference between the per 
capita GNP growth rates in the pre-reform and post-reform periods is even more marked. 
GNP per capita grew 4.3 per cent and 8.2 per cent in corresponding periods, GNP per 
capita has rapidly increased from $280 in 1980 to $530 in 1994.3  Figure 1 reveals an 
apparent growing trend of GNP per capita in China. Although the growth rate declined to 
4 or 5 per cent in 1989 and 1990 due to the efforts to deal with unacceptably high 
inflation and turmoil, the rates re-accelerated to 7 per cent in 1991, to 14 per cent in 1992, 
14 per cent in 1993, 11 per cent in 1994 4  and 10 per cent in 1995.5  
    Foreign trade and investment have played a crucial role in the growth of the Chinese 
economy. Its foreign trade currently ranks 11th in the world economy. Table 2 contains 
the growth index of the gross value of imports and exports, compared to the level of 1979 
(1979=100), and the degree of openness of the economy. The degree of openness of the 
economy, which is calculated by trade against GDP, is strikingly rising from 11 per cent 
in 1978, 18 per cent in 1985, 25 per cent in 1990, 33 per cent in 1992, to 40 per cent in 
1995, 6  as Figure 2 indicates, there is a rapidly growing trend of the growth of exports 
and imports. While accomplishing this trade growth, China has also recently achieved the 
foreign exchange reserves about $90 billion, ranking second in the world after Japan. 
Furthermore, China successfully implemented extensive exchange rate system reforms at 
the beginning of 1994, when the dual exchange rate system that had been in effect since 
1986 was unified on January 1 at the rate of Y8.7 per dollar. In addition, China has 
attracted tens of billions of dollars of foreign direct investment, ranking second only after 
the United States. Its place in the world is shown in Table 3.  
    Along with rapid economic growth, major changes in the economic structure have 
occurred, as shown in Table 4. Production and employment structures have shifted in 
favour of industry and services, suggesting a continuation of the industrialization process. 
During the 1980s the ratio of employment to population rose sharply, as did the 
investment rate and the export-GDP ratio. In each indicator the rate of increase was much 
higher in the 1980s than in the 1970s and 1960s. Excepting for the inflation rate, 
economic achievements in the last 15 years were very remarkable. The standard of living 
of the Chinese people has also increased as the result of reform. Between 1981 and 1990, 
the nominal share of basic necessities (such as staple food, clothing and fuel) in total expenditure declined for both rural and urban households while that of non-basic items 
(non-staple foods, housing, daily goods and others) as well as services, increased. For 
urban households, the nominal share of expenditure on staple food fell by almost half 
from 1981 to 1990. For rural households the nominal share of expenditure on non-staple 
food increased by more than 30 per cent from 1981 to 1990.7  
   
1.2 A mixed performance of the translation from economic growth to human 
development  
    Has economic growth translated into human development? There is no straightforward 
answer for this question. The achievements of the translation from economic growth to 
human development in both the pre-1979 period and post-1979 period have been mixed.  
    During the pre-reform era, some important elements of human development, along 
with a good subsequent economic growth, had pivotally improved, but other ones had 
not. The improvement can be demonstrated by remarkable increases in longevity and 
ease of access to health and education services, compared to the pre-1949 period, before 
the founding of the PRC. In 1949, China was among the poorest nations in the world and 
had very high levels of mortality, undernutrition and illiteracy. Life expectancy at birth 
was only 35 years and the infant mortality rate was 200 per 1000 live births, as Table 5 
shown. Since 1949, an outstanding development had emerged. As the trends in Figure 3 
show, the life expectancy at birth from 1950 to 1980 increases sharply. Life expectancy at 
birth was 40 years in the early 1950s,8  while it was 64 years in 1974 9 , 65 years in 1975 
10 . Figure 4 presents a trend of infant mortality rate, which rapidly declined from 195 at 
the beginning of the 1950s to 52 in the late 1970s. 11  Moreover, the primary enrolment 
ratio expanded from 49.2 per cent in 1952, 56.1 per cent in 1962 to 93.0 per cent in 1978. 
12  
    In addition, the basic needs of most of the Chinese people were fairly well satisfied 
prior to 1979 despite the fact that there had been relatively little increase in food 
availability per capita.13  The Chinese government increased the provision of several 
basic commodities and services to the poor such as staple foods, health care, primary 
education, etc. in both rural areas and urban areas, or directly provided subsidies or relief 
funds to the poor, laid-off, retired, elderly and disabled. It can be seen from Table 6 that 
government expenditures on pensions and social welfare relief funds was 1.89 billion 
Yuan in 1978, six times the figure of 1952.  
    However, China's record of human development during the pre-reform era is seriously 
flawed by the absence of essential human choice, such as political and economic 
freedom. Its good subsequent growth did not enlarge the choices of the Chinese people in 
economic and political affairs. The participation of people in planning for themselves is 
regarded to be one of the distinct elements of the human dimension.14  In China's case, 
people's participation was largely denied by a highly centralized economic planning 
system and human development strategy before reform. The central planning system was 
established in the early 1950s, based on the principle "unified leadership and unified administration." This system worked through three central planning mechanisms: (1) 
physical planning of production, (2) centralized allocation of materials, and (3) budgetary 
control of revenues and expenditures. The State Planning Commission and other central 
ministries directly controlled major enterprises, distributed funds and materials, and 
supervised fixed investment through a centralized budgetary allocation. The centre set 
compulsory financial targets for localities and had complete budgetary control over 
provincial government expenditures. Through the central planning mechanisms, the 
central government controlled almost all aspects of economic and social affairs. As a 
result, workers had no rights to chose their job; farmers had no rights to decide what to 
grow and how to grow; enterprises had no rights to purchase raw materials or semi-
products and to sell their products while markets were eliminated. Similarly, localities' 
participation in the operation and maintenance of development projects and programmes 
had been restricted by the central government. And the Chinese people had little freedom 
to participate in political affairs as well. There were no competitive elections, there was 
no multiparty system; it was impossible to form independent non-governmental 
organizations; the press was highly constrained.  
    This serious flaw has been partially corrected during the reform era. After 1979, the 
economic and social choices of the people have been significantly enlarged. 
Decentralization, especially, has brought economic freedom closer to the people by 
giving back rights of decision-making of the people and the market economy. Peasants, 
through the equal distribution of land (household responsibility systems), have 
considerable choice and incentive to increase their income. Enterprises have gained more 
autonomy than before due to the declining role of administrative regulations such as 
price-controls, wage-ceilings and production-quotas. They could set up the profit-sharing 
arrangements with the government, control fringe benefits and make decisions about 
selling and buying according to market signals. The former "unified allocation of labour" 
that provided a state-determined job for urban workers has been abandoned for all. Thus, 
the nature of the relationship between enterprises and the state that is characterized by 
paternalism 15  has been significantly changed. Like peasants and enterprises, localities 
have played increasingly important roles in promoting economic growth. Their dependent 
relationship with the centre has been altered from paternalism to either a rivalry or 
partnership.16  As rivals, when both the centre and localities insist on their own interests, 
they confront each other over issues. As partners, localities are willing to implement 
policies that are compatible with their interests or local interests.  
    The major indicators of human development are continuing to improve. Compared to 
Table 5, Table 7 shows a recent improvement in a specific year in some aspects of human 
development. In 1993, life expectancy rose to 71; infant mortality rate declined to 35; and 
the under-five mortality rate was 43. Real GDP per capita also has dramatically 
improved, rising from 723 PPP$ in 1960 to 2330 PPP$ in 1993. Figure 3 and 4 show the 
trends in life expectancy and infant mortality rate during the post-reform era as well. 
Progress in longevity and health are continuing to develop in the earlier trends, rather 
than a new departure (although the pace of improvement during the after-reform period 
has slowed down).      Furthermore, the growth pattern has significantly changed. First of all, the major 
source of growth has gone from state-owned enterprises to non-state-owned enterprises. 
The share of growth of the state-owned enterprises started to decline from 78 per cent in 
1979 to 48 per cent of gross output value of industry in 1992.17  It was the first time in 
the PRC's history that state-owned enterprises owned less than 50 per cent of industrial 
outputs. The figure continue to decline after 1992. Figure 5 and Figure 6 give us two 
different pictures of the structure of industrial output. Compared to the 1978 structure of 
industrial output, the growth share of state-owned enterprises in 1994 declined to 34 per 
cent, 44 per cent less than that of 1978, while individual-owned and other ownership 
including joint venture enterprises rose from zero to 25 per cent. This change indicates 
that the major source of growth is no longer determined by the state-owned enterprises, 
while non-state-owned enterprises have begun to play a decisive role in growth. More 
important, non-state-owned enterprises determine the pace of growth because an 
explosive growth of collective industry, private industry and joint venture industry 
outgrow the state sector. Table 8 tells a detail of the growth rates based on preceding 
year. In 1978, compared to the previous year's performance on a basis of comparable 
prices, state-owned enterprises grew faster than collective-owned enterprises. In 1979, 
both types of enterprises grew at almost the same rate. After 1979, collective-owned 
enterprises, at a much higher rate, outgrew state-owned enterprises in every single year, 
while individual, joint venture and other enterprises even greatly outgrew collective-
owned enterprises. In 1994, gross output value of industry increased by 26 per cent, 
among which, state-owned enterprises grew only 6.5 per cent while collective-owned, 
individual-owned and joint venture and other firms grew correspondingly 29.8 per cent, 
58.3 per cent and 68.5 per cent.  
    The growth of non-state-owned enterprises not only largely determines the pace of 
growth but also significantly changes the structure of employment by absorbing a large 
amount of labour. Many of these non-state-owned enterprises are characterized by 
labour-intensive industry since their products are mostly textiles, garments, shoes, toys 
and consumer electronics. Their growth represents a generation of jobs. In the pre-reform 
era, employees of state-owned enterprises made up 79 per cent of the urban work force. 
This figure has declined during the reform. Table 9 suggests a trend of declining role of 
state-owned enterprises in terms of the structure of employment, while non-state-owned 
enterprises provide much more employment opportunity. The impact has been especially 
dramatic in commerce. Between 1978 and 1992, the collective share of commerce-related 
urban employment jumped from 16 to 34 per cent, while the state sector share dropped 
from 84 per cent to 44 per cent.18  As for job creation, the number of jobs expanded most 
quickly during the 1980s in joint venture enterprises, rising at an average annual rate of 
nearly 60 per cent between 1984 and 1992. In terms of urban self-employment, it is 
believed that the figure has been seriously underestimated. The State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce in Beijing admitted in 1992 that about one-third of all urban self-
employed in large cities were not registered. One author estimates that the proportion of 
the overall urban work force employed in the private economy was 16.76 per cent in 
1985, and 33.93 per cent in 1992, and raised from the official 5 per cent to a full one-
third.19  Table 10 provides additional information concerning the growth of private 
enterprise employment. As this table shows, in a few years, the number of registered private enterprises rose from 91,000 units to 420,000 units, and the number of persons 
employed rose from 1.85 million to 6.35 million.  
    Moreover, the foreign trade decentralization leads the Chinese people to have much 
wider access to the opportunities of expanded trade than before. In the 1980s, numerous 
new foreign trade enterprises and companies were set up, including provincially-run 
enterprises, city-run enterprises, collective-run enterprises and even individual-run 
enterprises. The monopolistic position of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
and Trade (MOFERT, now called MOFTEC--the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation) was replaced by a new pluralistic organizational framework. In 
December 1987 only around 800 enterprises were permitted to import and export; this 
figure skyrocketed to around 5000 in early 1988. Except for certain commodities, such as 
coal, oil, food grains and steel, which are still exported by enterprise under the direct 
control of MOFERT, all other commodities can be exported by non-MOFERT 
enterprises. Many rural township and village enterprises (TVEs) were permitted to enter 
foreign trade activities. Table 11 shows that rural TVEs and joint venture enterprises 
produce a growing share of the exports. This trend was most obvious in the second half 
of the 1980s. Rural TVE exports jumped from about US$4 billion to more than US$12 
billion between 1985 and 1990, and joint venture exports from around a quarter of a 
million dollars in 1985 to 47.6 billion dollars in 1995, accounting for 32 per cent of total 
exports. 20  
    Thus, the nature of China's economic growth has switched from centralized growth to 
decentralized growth during the reform era. It can be called a participatory growth 21  
since it has released vast initiatives at local and individual levels and enlarged people's 
participation in economic growth by generating millions of jobs and increasing incomes 
in ways which have benefited ordinary Chinese people. In this regard, there is no doubt 
that China's growth successfully translated into human development.  
    The performance of human development during the reform era, however, contains its 
failures, as can be seen in Table 7. Literacy rate and enrolment ratio for all levels are 
poor. The rate of adult illiteracy fell from 38.1 per cent in 1962 to 23.5 per cent in 1982, 
but has seen a resurgent increase in the more recent years (it was 26.8 per cent in 1987). 
22  From the same table, an obvious declining trend of enrolment ratio for all levels can 
also be seen, dropping from 50 per cent in 1980 to 43 per cent in 1992. Figure 7 suggests 
that the total primary enrolment ratio fluctuated during the reform era. It climbed in 1978 
and went down afterwards. In 1983 it rose again and reached a peak of 130 in 1987 and 
then declined again.  
    Achievements of basic education and health are even worse in remote and 
mountainous areas. Many remote villages do not have the minimal conditions for running 
schools. Many of their school buildings are unsafe and the quality of teachers is poor. In 
rural primary schools only about 60 per cent of students complete their five years of 
schooling. The rate of transition from primary school to junior high school is only 59 per 
cent, while the rate of transition from junior high school to senior high school is 10 per 
cent in the countryside. Nation-wide, there are still 457 counties that have not yet fully implemented the universal system of nine years of mandatory education. In 1987 among 
school-age children (6 to 14) in the countryside throughout the nation, approximately 30 
million were not in school, with 25 per cent of them having been to school but 
withdrawn, and 38 per cent being those who had never enrolled in school. The situation is 
similar for medical care and public health. Many areas in the countryside have had a 
shortage of doctors, of medicines and of paramedical staff. As of the end of 1991, a third 
of towns did not have hospitals, and about 100,000 villages, which make up about 12 per 
cent in the country, did not have clinics.23  
    Although economic growth quickened and the economic choices of the Chinese people 
had expanded, certain aspects of social progress slowed down. How do we explain this 
mixed performance of the translation from economic growth to human development?  
   
2. The analytical framework: Explaining a mixed performance  
2.1 Institutional change:  
    The change from highly centralized institutions to decentralized institutions has mixed 
impacts on the translation from economic growth to human development. On the one 
hand, it facilitates the translation; on the other, its undeveloped elements impede the 
translation.  
    The institution 24  is considered as a central variable in the translation from economic 
growth to human development. In this section, China's institutions are regarded as a 
structure of institutions, including state institutions, social institutions and market 
institutions. State institutions consist of central government and local governments 
organizations. Social institutions here refer to both non-governmental organizations and 
non-market organizations. Markets are institutions, created by conscious design and 
governed by sets of rules. 25  Since 1979, China has been converting its institutional 
structure from a highly centralized one into a decentralized one, which is being achieved 
in a number of ways: First, the centre transfers resources, responsibilities and the rights to 
decision-making to lower levels of government and other public organizations outside the 
normal bureaucratic structure of central government (delegation), coupled with revenue 
sharing or other forms of transfers from the central government to the regional and local 
levels. Second, the centre transfers some administrative responsibility or authority to 
lower levels within central government ministries or agencies (deconcentration).26  And 
third, China's decentralization also takes the form of a transfer of power, resources and 
responsibility to social institutions--the private sector and other social sectors.  
State Institutions  
1. The downward shift of institutional functions  
    The Chinese government reallocates its institutional functions in the reform period, 
which has changed the role of state institution in economic growth and human 
development. The central government has made tremendous changes in institutional 
design. It has undergone two structural reforms in the 1980s. One of them was the 1982 reform. It included: (1) the dismantling of state council commissions which had acted as 
overlords to each of the hierarchical "systems"; (2) reduction of the total number of State 
Council institutions from 100 to 61; and (3) reduction of the State Council staff by 34.7 
per cent, from a total of 49,000 to 32,000. In 1988, further reform of the State Council 
had been undertaken. This reform focused on the downward shift of government 
functions. The central government, through the decentralization, has changed its 
institutional functions from complete intervention to selective intervention. It relaxed its 
control over resource allocation (between 1979-89, the number of raw materials 
controlled by the centre fell from 256 to 27, and the proportion of capital goods from 80 
per cent to 20-30 per cent), gave greater autonomy to the local authorities over 
investment (the jurisdiction to approve investment projects of provincial government has 
been enhanced from less than 10 million yuan in 1984 to less than 50 million yuan), and 
decentralized managerial power over enterprises.  
    After the central government institutions shifted focus from direct decision-making to 
providing a supportive role, local institutions have effectively played a role in promoting 
economic growth by facilitating the implementation of projects and programmes in a 
wide variety of local circumstances. More important, in some special circumstances, local 
governments, based on the knowledge and desires of the local population, created new 
projects and programmes in order to engage local community support and participation. 
The creation of the household responsibility system in the late 1970s in Anhui Province 
was an example. There, after the severe drought of the fall of 1978, a great scale of 
poverty faced local governments. Local leaders were unable to find economic solutions 
among the policy alternatives designated by the central government. Motivated by a 
sense of crisis, the local leaders and the populace brought about the household 
responsibility system, even after it was ruled out by the central leadership at the very 
beginning of the reforms.27  
2. The paradox of decentralized institutions  
    Analytically, decentralization is likely to promote economic activity through several 
routes including an increased infusion of capital and other resources, the more extensive 
provision of infrastructure, and a more effective enabling environment than would have 
been the case under a centralized system. In addition, decentralization will expand 
employment, improve economic efficiency (by introducing a market-friendly approach) 
and enlarge participation of local people in economic and social affairs. It is also likely to 
make expenditure decisions which agree with the basic priorities of human development. 
It is argued that the overall picture of decentralization reflects significant potential for 
human development. 28  
    Empirically, decentralization indeed has reflected significant potential for economic 
growth but is not necessary to guarantee the achievement of human development due to 
the existence of the paradox of decentralized institutions. The paradox of decentralized 
institutions is that decentralization requires breaking the custom of dependence of 
localities on the centre, at the same time it demands more efficient central government 
and more sophisticated governing crafts at the national level to guide the development 
and reform process. This paradox of decentralization determines the presumed conflict between reform policies and growth with human development.29  Reform policies 
require the correction of price distortions, a greater role for the market mechanism and 
less government intervention--an intentional withdrawal of the government intervention 
from the economy. By contrast, human development requires more government 
intervention and a greater government presence, particularly in education and health. In 
certain circumstances, the presumed conflict between reform policies and growth with 
human development could be overcome if demand management is improved, price 
distortions are corrected, unnecessary public intervention is reduced, and inefficient and 
corrupt economic and administrative controls are done away with. Thus resources would 
be released to achieve both higher growth and better allocations for human resources 
development. However, if all these necessary conditions do not exist or only partially 
exist, then the presumed conflict could become real. In China's case, necessary conditions 
only partially exist. For example, a part of price distortions has been corrected but the 
uncorrected part still plays a negative role in pursuing growth and human development 
simultaneously, and so do unnecessary public intervention and corrupt economic and 
administrative controls. Moreover, decentralization in China weakens the ability of the 
central government to mobilize resources, which has negatively affected government 
expenditures and revenues in terms of growth and human development (this will be 
discussed below). However, this conflict, to some extent, can be overcome by the 
emergence of social institutions.  
Social institutions  
    After decentralization, social institutions in China played a greater role in economic 
and social affairs than before. Social institutions such as collective enterprises,30  private 
enterprises and joint ventures are significantly involved in the process of growth as 
discussed above. Some social institutions have been positively involved in some aspects 
of human development, when state institutions fail to provide necessary social services. 
The stories of the social welfare evolution in developed rural areas of China such as 
Guangdong Province, Hebei Province and Jiangsu Province are relevant. In these areas, 
the villages and townships enjoy a relative prosperity due to the creation of local 
enterprises. The profits of the enterprises are not directly redistributed to the inhabitants 
but part of them are used to finance community funds. The funds have different social 
functions: to support the local school for adults as well as the elderly and the disabled, to 
establish a system of insurance which enables peasants to recover part of their expenses 
in case of illness, and to encourage education. 31  This welfare system is designed to 
serve the interests of the inhabitants of the locality to which the enterprises belongs.  
    In the field of education, the role of social institutions also can be found. Since state 
investment in education is not sufficient, non-governmental sectors start to become 
involved in the opening of schools. To date, social efforts have opened more than 1,000 
primary schools, 600 junior middle schools and 300 senior middle schools 32  and even 
higher educational institutions.  
    These two examples indicate that, in the field of education, health and social welfare, 
in general, market institution is unable to translate economic growth into human 
development. The state could not completely correct the failures of the market institution due to its weak ability to mobilize resources. In this sense, social institutions could 
overcome both failures to a certain degree.  
Market institutions  
    Markets are institutions which structure, organize and legitimize contractual 
agreements and the exchange of property rights. They not only provide price conventions 
but are a means to communicate information regarding products, quantities, potential 
buyers and potential sellers. 33  A central issue in growth and human development is the 
interaction between state institutions and market institutions. The World Development 
Report 1991 stressed the complementary ways markets and states can work together. If 
markets can work well, and are allowed to, there can be a substantial economic gain. If 
markets fail, and states intervene cautiously and judiciously in response, there is a further 
gain. And if the two are brought together, the evidence suggests that the whole is greater 
than the sum. When markets and states have worked in cooperation, the results have been 
spectacular, but when they have worked in opposition, the results have been disastrous. 
China's central planning system which supplanted the market in the pre-reform era 
produced disastrous results in terms of growth as the report describes in section 1.1. 
Market institutions are the best guarantee for economic growth. During the reform, the 
opening of product, capital, labour and technology markets that are rising demand for 
labour, rising productivity, rising wages, lowering prices of the goods the people could 
buy, significantly fosters the rapid growth of the whole economy. But they have a limited 
role to play in translating from economic growth to human development. Market 
institutions are not the guarantee for equitable income distribution, primary education and 
health care for the poor; by contrast, market forces concentrated benefits in the hands of 
the few. Thus government intervention to spread the benefits downward to the poor is a 
must.  
The problem of China is that in the decentralized institutions, it becomes difficult for the 
central government to provide basic social services due to its own weak capability to 
mobilize resources, while many local governments ignore the issues of education and 
health due to the lack of commitment and incapability. For very basic services the central 
government should provide leadership and financing to the entire population at fees 
below cost, for which no market institution has offered a substitute. Market institutions 
that have recovered adversely affect the social sectors, while social institutions are still 
too weak to play an important role in establishing a close linkage between growth and 
human development. In this regard, although the decentralized institutions give the 
Chinese people the opportunity for higher economic growth, their undeveloped elements 
seriously impede the translation to human development.  
2.2 Reform policies: The designed reform policies have mixed impacts on the 
translation from economic growth to human development  
    High economic growth rates do not automatically translate into higher levels of human 
development. Appropriate and well-designed macroeconomic policies are required in 
order to translate the benefits of growth into the lives of people. China offers, through 
decollectivization and rural industrialization, an example of a combination of institutional 
reforms and growth-oriented macroeconomic policies promoting rapid agricultural growth since 1979. The institutional reforms in the countryside consisted of replacement 
of the commune system with the "production responsibility system". Macroeconomic 
policy reform ended the state monopoly on procurement of agricultural produce, gave 
price incentives to farmers and formed markets in rural produce, credit and labour. The 
rapid growth of rural industries has enabled China to absorb a large part of the surplus 
labour that emerged in agriculture after the institutional reforms, and has done much to 
increase the income of peasant households and to alleviate rural poverty.  
Decollectivization policy  
    The traditional farming institution in rural China prior to the founding of the PRC was 
the independent family farm. In 1953, the government transformed the household 
farming system to a collective system. Due to the characteristic of "everyone eating from 
the same big pot", the collective members' incentives to work were very low. Empirical 
studies show that the total factor productivity in the collective system was about 20 to 30 
per cent lower than in the household system. 34  It is argued that collectivization was 
seen as a fatally flawed process, both intrinsically encouraging state interference in 
collective decisions and weakening the link between individual performance and 
income.35  
    Decollectivization started in the poorer areas in 1979. The government encouraged 
collectives to delegate the agricultural production from collectives to smaller groups in 
order to improve the management of labour, but the household farming system remained 
prohibited until late 1981. In late September 1980 the Central Committee issued 
Document 75, "Announcement Regarding Several Issues Concerned with the Further 
Strengthening and Perfection of the Production Responsibility System in Agriculture". 
For the first time, the production responsibility system was regarded as central 
government policy in two kinds of circumstances: (1) in poor and backward areas, where 
the population had "lost faith in the collective", and (2) where household contracting had 
already been carried out and found satisfactory. In the late 1981, full official approval of 
the household system in agriculture was eventually given. By that time, 45 per cent of the 
collectives in China had already been torn down, and by the end of 1983, 98 per cent of 
the collectives had adopted the household system.36  
    As a result of swift decollectivization, agricultural performance has dramatically 
improved. Agricultural gross output value grew around 9 per cent per year between 1978 
and 1984. Major agricultural products have tremendously increased. The annual growth 
rate of per capita output of grain rose from 0.2 per cent in the period of 1957-78 to 3.8 
per cent in the 1978-84 period, cotton from -.06 per cent to 17.5 per cent, edible oil from 
-0.9 per cent to 14 per cent, etc. For the first time in many years, China's diet began to 
improve, with significant additions of protein and fats.37  
    This very same policy, however, has legitimized and facilitated a reduction in social 
services previously provided by village and commune-level collectives, especially in the 
fields of basic education and health services 38  In the mid-1980s, the central government 
delegated financial responsibility for rural basic education and primary health services to 
the local communities. As a result, investment for basic education and health care was reduced. The drop-out rate of school children is increasing and many poor people cannot 
afford medical care (this will be discussed in more detail in empirical issues).  
   
The rural industrialization policy  
    It was estimated that massive disguised unemployment in agriculture before the late 
1970s had amounted to between one-third and one-half of the total labour force in many 
areas. The establishment of the household responsibility system revealed that a large 
percentage of the farm labour force could leave agriculture without reducing output. The 
rapid development of rural industrialization become a significant source of employment 
in the countryside after 1979.  
    The major power of the rural industrialization was CBEs (later called TVEs). 
Government policy, to a great extent, significantly determined the raise and decline of the 
CBEs. During the 1950s, the central government, according to Mao Zedong's goal of 
accelerating the pace of industrialization and speeding transformation into a communist 
society, launched a campaign to "run industry by the masses" as part of the People's 
Commune Campaign and the Great Leap Forward Campaign. During these campaigns, 
CBEs grew rapidly. In 1958, total employment of CBEs was 18 million and the gross 
value of CBE products was 6 billion yuan.39  Following the failure of the Great Leap 
Forward, the central government decided to shut down most CBEs. From 1960 to 1963, 
the number of CBEs dropped from 117,000 to 11,000, the gross value of CBE products 
fell from 1.98 billion yuan to 0.42 billion yuan. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976), the central government policies, such as "learn from Dazhai",40  had a direct 
influence on the CBEs. During this period, tens of thousands of small CBEs were set up. 
In 1976, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, the number of CBEs was 1.1 million, 
employment was 17.9 million, and gross output was 27.2 billion yuan. However, markets 
were eliminated, and CBEs were tightly controlled by central and provincial government. 
After 1978, accompanied with the economic reforms in the agricultural sector, central 
government policy toward CBEs changed markedly; CBEs were encouraged and central 
and provincial government controls were relaxed in order to raise efficiency and solve 
employment problems in the rural areas. In 1979, the State Council issued the 
"Provisional Regulations on the Growth of CBEs". In the regulation, the most important 
policies benefiting the CBEs are: (1) to permit and encourage the growth of CBEs; (2) to 
giver CBEs more autonomy in production and marketing decisions; and (3) to reduce or 
abolish taxation of CBEs.  
    Under the encouraging policies, CBSs (the CBES were renamed township-village 
enterprises, TVEs, after the dissolution of the people's commune system in 1984) grew 
rapidly. Their growth performance is outstanding by world historical standards. In 1978, 
total industrial production of TVEs was 49.3 billion yuan, which accounted for 11.6 per 
cent of the gross national industrial production. In 1992, this figure rose to 2036 billion 
yuan, which accounted for 38.6 per cent of gross national industrial production.41  The 
rapid growth of the rural industrialization led to the creation of millions of jobs. Table 12 
shows tha fast development of employment in TVEs. From 1978 to 1994, total 
employment of TVEs 42  increased from 28 million, which accounted for 7 per cent of the total employment, to 120 million, which accounted for 20 per cent of total 
employment and 28 per cent of total rural labour force. In some relatively industrialized 
areas, a labour shortage problem actually appears. The rapid growth of rural 
industrialization has had some obstructing impact on human development, as critics claim 
that rapid expansion of TVEs, encroaching on the surrounding arable land, has 
contributed to environmental degradation.  
The fiscal policy toward social sectors  
    Government budgetary expenditure is the main policy which directly affects human 
development. Health, education, social welfare and other social services usually provided 
by government can be measured by the share of government budgetary expenditures in 
GDP. Table 13 provides a detail of the expenditure structure of government. As the table 
shows, the share of total government expenditures in GDP has sharply declined, from 32 
per cent of GDP in 1979 to 13 per cent in 1994. Government expenditure on culture, 
education, science and health care also decreased from 3.8 at the beginning of the 1980s 
to 2.8 per cent in 1994. This indicates that the fiscal capability of the government to 
mobilize resources has been weakened during the reform era. As a matter of fact, it is 
accurate to say that the central government's capability to gain budget revenue has 
become weak, but that of local governments has not. Table 14 demonstrates that the 
central government share of the budget revenues and expenditures has dropped while the 
shares of local governments increased.  
    In recent years, local government's shares accounted for about 60-65 per cent in both 
revenues and expenditures, which are much higher than that of the central government. 
With more resources in their control, local governments have become increasingly 
capable of pursuing goals according to their own preference rather than central 
guidelines. They intend to invest as much money in productive projects as they can 
generate. They are reluctant to invest in infrastructure projects such as energy, education 
and railroads because such projects generally need large amounts of investment, take a 
long time to finish and run a high risk. 43  
    Each of the reform policies that are discussed in this report has both positive and 
negative impacts on the translation from economic growth to human development. 
Decollectivization releases peasants' incentives and significantly improves agricultural 
performance on the one hand; on the other, it facilitates a reduction in social services 
previously provided by collectives. Rural industrialization that was designed with a 
concern with employment generation, letting China absorb a large amount of the surplus 
labour, has less negative impacts than decollectivization on human progress except the 
effect on environment. By contrast, the change of government expenditures has more 
destructive impact on the social sector than other policies. With limited capability to 
mobilize and collect resources, a weak central government has little to redistribute, thus 
becoming unable to adjust the distribution of income and wealth to assure conformance 
with what society considers "fair" and "just".44  
   2.3 The quality of governance with a lack of accountability and transparency and 
reduced commitment towards the social services detrimentally affects the 
translation from economic growth to human development.  
    Governance refers to the exercise of authority and control.45  In other words, 
governance means governments use their power and authority to establish and maintain 
the institutions that regulate social and economic interaction, and promote economic 
growth and human development. The quality of governance is seen as a key determinant 
of a country's economic growth and human development. Some writers suggest a concept 
of "good governance". What is a good governance? Good governance refers to 
accountability (including legitimacy), participation of institutional pluralism, 
transparency and predictability.46  
    Specifically, in order for state activity to reach its goals efficiently and merit the label 
"good", first, government should be accountable. By accountability, we mean that public 
servants and others holding public office can be held accountable for their actions. 
Without accountability, the risk of corruption, which is defined as "the illegal use of 
public office for private gain",47  and misappropriation of public money increases 
dramatically. Second, government activity should be transparent. Essential to attaining 
this is the availability of information which would allow an assessment to be made of 
government activity. Third, governments' own activities and programmes should be 
geared towards improving the well-being of the poor and should leave self-help 
organizations and non-governmental organizations sufficient room to manage. Fourth, 
governments should establish and enforce a stable legal and economic framework which 
ensures the predictability of state and individual action. Fifth, economic and social 
progress are not the only goals of good governance; civil liberty and the ability to 
participate in the political system can also be regarded as important elements of a full and 
meaningful life that should contribute to the well being of individuals and the 
development of societies.  
    The quality of governance of China can be characterized by the lack of accountability. 
Its quality has been negatively affected by significantly increasing corruption. Corruption 
has reached such as extent that it is seriously eroding the basic legitimacy of the Chinese 
political system.48  No one has more conspicuously clarified the problem than Deng 
Xiaoping himself: "Bureaucracy remains a major and widespread problem in the political 
life of our Party and the state. Its harmful manifestations include...abusing power, 
deceiving superiors and subordinates, practicing favoritism, offering bribes, participating 
in corrupt practices..."49  Other leaders admitted that if corruption becomes widespread, 
China's reforms and opening to the outside world will be terminated.50  
    There is an economic root to corruption. Price reform provides a gap between planning 
prices and market prices that represents economic rents. By 1990, two-thirds of 
agricultural products, over 80 per cent of manufactured consumer goods, almost all 
services and one-third of producer goods were being traded at market prices,51  but still a 
part of products are controlled by the state planning. Thus the economic rent is being 
produced. In order to seek the rents, government officials who have the power of distributing productive resources have an enormous incentive to distribute the resources 
to benefit themselves or their relatives and friends. Thus, corruption has significant 
negative effects on income distribution and social welfare since government officials 
with important positions and resources can benefit while ordinary consumers cannot 
benefit from the gaps.  
    There is also an institutional root to corruption, which can be seen from the gap 
between swift economic growth and sluggish institutional change. In other words, 
corruption is symptomatic of the weakness of state institutions coupled with rapid 
economic growth. The nature of China's transitional economy has created situations in 
which corruption carries few risks and pays large dividends, and government officials at 
all levels can use their offices to affect economic outcomes without any restraint or with 
less restraint. For them, the dividing line between public and private, government and 
market, is blurred, and legal and moral systems to define permissible behaviour are 
lacking.  
    In recent years, combating corruption, eliminating bribery and embezzlement, setting 
up restraint remain China's priorities. In 1994, China uncovered 95,000 cases of 
corruption, and the courts sentenced 20,186 such culprits, including a vice minister, 28 
bureau directors and 202 branch directors.52  A total of 65,000 people were disciplined 
by Party disciplinary measures and 37,000 dealt with through administrative 
regulation.53  Meanwhile, China started to reform its civil service system in 1993, when 
the "Regulations on State Functionaries", was officially adopted. One of these acts 
prohibits government departments from operating private businesses in a conflict of 
interest context. However, because of the lack of an effective supervisionary system, 
there are still a large number of corruption and bribery cases involving law-enforcement, 
economic administration and senior government officials.  
    The quality of governance of China is negatively affected by the lack of transparency 
as well. The government still tightly controls the flow of ideas and information. For the 
Chinese people, freedom of speech, press and assembly, and civil liberty are still 
seriously restricted. China's closed system, in turn, multiplies opportunities for corruption 
because the procedures for public decision-making are not clear.  
    More importantly, the quality of governance of China is critically affected by reduced 
state commitment towards improving the well-being of the poor, especially in the fields 
of education and health services. This happens when the central government transfers a 
part of the responsibility for education and public health to local government, and the 
latter invests in production projects which solve the problem of local unemployment and 
gain profits instantly rather than invest in education and health care. The state has partly 
retreated from intervention in the related public service domain where the market fails, 
which has caused many problems. Some people who are not able to take advantage of 
market-oriented changes and are without a strong social safety net have fallen into 
poverty. In sum, due to the lack of accountability and transparency, there is no guarantee 
that China's scarce public funds can be used in an efficient manner in the pursuit of 
macroeconomic and social objectives. And due to reduced commitment towards public services, social progress has stagnated.  
   
3. Empirical issues  
3.1 Income Distribution  
    Unequal distribution of income does not result from natural economic growth 
processes. Rather it depends on the political and institutional arrangements according to 
which rising national incomes are distributed among the broad segments of a population. 
What are the effects of reform on China's income distribution? Are market-oriented 
reforms likely to generate increased income inequality? These questions can only be 
settled empirically. In China, income is defined to include both the usual cash payments 
and payments-in-kind valued at market prices; agricultural output produced for self-
consumption at market prices; the imputed value of housing services in the case of 
owner-occupied dwellings, and in the case of households living in public housing, the 
value of the rent subsidy; the value of ration coupon subsides; and the value of other 
direct subsidies received from government minus direct taxes. 54  
    During reform, China's income distribution is characterized by the following features: 
First, income inequality between rural and urban areas is rising. As Table 15 shown, the 
income of urban residents was 3.48 times that of the peasants in 1957. Before the start of 
the reform in 1978, the ratio of urban to rural income declined to 2.36. Rural-urban 
inequalities had diminished somewhat and the income of the rural population had 
climbed to 42 per cent of the urban income. This ratio continued to decrease until 1985. 
After 1985 the ratio started to rise again. In 1994, the income of urban residents was 2.61 
times that of the peasants, which shows the greatest gap after 1978. If the various types of 
subsidies that urban residents enjoy are considered, and if all kinds of extra 
responsibilities and burdens from the peasant incomes such as expenses and fees for 
subsidizing the members of families of the People's Liberation Army and revolutionary 
martyrs, subsidizing for cadres, and for planned childbirth and etc., are deducted, the 
actual income gap could be expressed as a ratio of 4 to 1.55  
    Second, the sources of rural income inequality differ from that of urban income 
inequality. Table 16 and Table 17 contain the information concerning rural and urban 
income inequality and its sources. Measurement of the distribution of income is based on 
the Gini ratio. 56  A concentration ratio lower (higher) than the Gini ratio means that the 
distribution of the corresponding source of income has an equalizing or disequalizing 
effect on the overall distribution of income. Table 16 suggests that in rural areas, the 
largest source of income is from family production activities that has an equalizing effect 
on the distribution of income (index=0.282); the second largest source of income, wages, 
is the most disequalizing source of income (index=0.710). Table 17 shows that the 
distribution of urban income is more equal than the distribution of rural income. Table 18 
tells us different Gini ratios in both rural and urban areas. Urban Gini ratios was 0.23 in 
1988, 0.37 in 1994 while rural Gini ratios was 0.38 and 0.41 correspondingly. The top 10 
per cent of the urban population receives only 3.2 times as much income as the bottom 10 per cent, while in the rural areas, 62 per cent of income from wages is received by the 
richest 10 per cent of individuals. The poorest 20 per cent of the population receive only 
one per cent of their income from this source. Wage income, thus, has a completely 
asymmetrical effect on the distribution of income in urban and rural areas. In urban areas, 
where almost every household has access to this source of income, wage income has a 
strongly equalizing effect; while in rural areas, where access to wage employment is 
limited, it has a strongly disequalizing effect.  
    Third, there is coexistence of polarization and egalitarianism in urban areas. According 
to one household survey conducted in the 1988, the cash income of workers and 
employees in the private sector and in the public sector is unequal (see Table 19). The 
Gini ratio in the private sector is much greater than that of the public sector.57  As Table 
20 shows, the Gini coefficient in the private sector is 0.493 while in the public sector it is 
0.232. In addition, a Beijing government survey reported that the income of private 
employers sometimes was ten times that of their employees. Taxi drivers, in the private 
sector, earn much more than bus drivers. Workers and employees in joint venture 
enterprises and in foreign owned firms earn more than those working in state enterprises. 
By contrast, income inequality inside the plan narrowed and became even narrower after 
the reform of the wage system was introduced in 1985. This is evident from the data in 
one survey which contains the findings of a sample survey of 48 cities conducted by the 
State Statistical Bureau. The survey shows that within the public administration, the ratio 
of the lowest to the highest wage declined from about 1:3 prior to the reform to about 1:2 
after the reform. A new egalitarianism has emerged seemingly contrary to the declared 
wishes of the national leadership.  
    Overall, income inequality is rising in China. How do we explain the change of the 
income distribution of China? First, relatively rising income inequality is partly the 
intention of the reformers. Before reform, one of the most striking aspects of the old 
system was the virtue of extreme egalitarianism. 58  Egalitarianism, which was described 
as "everyone eating from the same big pot", resulted in a high degree of equality but it 
has significantly negative results for labour productivity and the efficiency of labour 
allocation. There was a widespread consensus among the reformers that extreme 
"egalitarianism" under the Mao era had hindered economic development because it had 
damaged incentives, created widespread inefficiency in terms of resource allocation and 
utilization and, finally, lowered the pace of improvement of the living standard. In order 
to overcome this extreme egalitarianism and stimulate an improvement in efficiency, a 
policy that "let a few grow rich first so that the others can follow their example", which 
became one of the primary purposes of economic reform, has been adopted. Meanwhile, 
a series of policies have been introduced to stimulate incentives. In rural areas, the 
working points system, along with the commune system had been replaced by the 
production responsibility system. In urban areas, wage differentials have been widened, 
the returns to formal education increased, private saving and investment encouraged. 
More important, market mechanisms have been introduced to rural and urban reform.  
    Replacing the extreme "egalitarianism" by introducing market mechanisms has gained 
the support of a majority of workers, peasants and officials. One survey on the attitudes of workers towards the income system provides relevant evidence. Data were collected in 
July 1989 from 506 participants from a wide variety of different organizations in Henan 
Province. The results show that the most preferred system is one graded by actual ability 
and skills, followed by a graded technical system and then a seniority system. The least 
preferred form is an egalitarian wage system.  
    Secondly, relatively rising income inequality is a result of asymmetrical institutional 
reform. Relatively rising income inequality is a complex transitional phenomenon in the 
case of China due to the existence of a dual structure in income distribution,59  which is a 
product of asymmetrical institutional change. A dual structure in income distribution 
means coexistence of planned and unplanned income distribution systems. In those 
economic activities in which mandatory plans still predominate, egalitarianism continues 
to prevail and income differentials remain narrow. In those economic activities that fall 
outside the plan, polarization of incomes has occurred. This coexistence of egalitarianism 
and polarization was caused by a hybrid system of plan and market, where production, 
material supplies and price setting have been governed partially by the state plan, and 
partially by market forces.  
    Thirdly, Chinese leaders strive to avoid significant inequality of income that can 
threaten political stability. Present Chinese leaders such as Li Peng and Jiang Zemin 
accept the view that was clearly expressed by Zhao Ziyang: The policies of distribution 
we formulate should encourage some enterprises and individuals to become prosperous 
before others through good management and honest work, thus widening the differences 
in personal income to a reasonable degree. But at the same time, these policies should 
prevent the polarization of rich and poor, enable all people to move to prosperity and 
bring about social equity while improving efficiency.60  
    The Chinese government has proposed to adopt a series of policies to prevent 
polarization as follows: (1) to institutionalize the order of market competition to protect 
legal business and legal income; (2) to utilize the means of taxation to adjust the income 
disparity of households; (3) to further reform and complete the social security system to 
guarantee the basic needs for retired people, the unemployed, the disabled, low-income 
families and laid-off workers; and (4) to make all efforts to develop a rural economy, 
especially in poor areas.61  
3.2 Reduction of poverty  
    Poverty is defined as the inability to attain a minimal standard of living. It will be 
useful to examine what kind of institutional arrangement and whether macroeconomic 
policies have alleviated poverty by leading to higher incomes for the poor. In China, the 
incidence of poverty (the percentage share of rural and urban households falling below 
the poverty line) rapidly declined. Before 1979, vast poverty occurred in rural areas. In 
1959-60, the famine killed more than 30 million people, most of them peasants. In 1970s, 
many hungry peasants throughout the country went to cities to beg for food. At that time, 
there were 250 million rural dwellers in poverty.62  In the late 1970s, rural poverty 
became an issue of paramount importance when the new leaders took power. A special investigation into rural poverty was carried out in 1978. The astonishing reality of the 
situation of rural poverty created a sense of crisis within the new leadership and became 
part of the logic of reform. Fifteen years later after reform, the poverty population in rural 
areas has been reduced to 80 million, the incidence of poverty declined from 30.7 per 
cent in 1978 to 8.8 per cent in 1992. 63  In addition, food security and food production 
have significantly increased, which also reflects the decline in poverty. In Table 21, daily 
calorie supply per capita unmistakably rose from 2086 in pre-reform era to 2729 in 1992; 
and food production per capita increased by 76 per cent in 1993 compared to 1979-81. 
Table 22 suggests that China, compared to other developing countries, has achieved 
outstanding performance in the field of food security. Indonesia is the only country ahead 
of China in this area.  
    However, many remote and mountainous areas are still very poor.64  A closer look at 
the profile of the poor in China reveals that most of the rural poor reside in the remote 
and mountainous terrain of its central and western regions. The western and central 
regions contain the largest percentages of poor counties, as shown in Table 23. The 
incidence of poverty in the coastal provinces in 1989 was 3.6 while in the central and 
western provinces, this figure was 11.2 and 18.4 respectively. The regional differences in 
per capita GDP is increasing as well. Compared to 1992, per capita GDP of the coastal 
provinces increased 41 per cent in 1993 and 10 per cent higher than that of the central 
provinces and 16 per cent higher than that of the western provinces. The incidence of 
poverty was highest in the western region. Provinces with the highest relative incidence 
of poverty are Gansu, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Yunan and Ningxia. In 
addition, there are 49.8 per cent of counties in the western region and 42.1 per cent of 
counties in central region with average per capita rural income below the poverty line 
(the poverty line was defined as 300 yuan in 1989).  
    The overall picture of poverty reduction in China is that in the late 1970s and 
beginning of the 1980s there was a rapid increase in income and a great reduction in the 
numbers of the poor. But after 1984-1985, the rate of income growth slowed notably, and 
the poverty count stabilized and may have risen somewhat in rural areas.  
    There are both institutional reasons and policy reasons for the overall picture of the 
poverty reduction. The demise of the commune institutions has had a mixed impact on 
poverty reduction. On the one hand, it has decreased poverty by enlarging private-sector 
participation in the production of goods and services; on the other hand, the 
disappearance of the commune institutions has increased the difficulty for elderly, 
disabled and poor people to access health and education because certain services which 
they had previously been provided without charge now have to be paid for by the 
consumer.65  In relatively developed rural areas, some social institutions such as the 
community could provide access to health and education services, especially for the poor 
and elderly, but in less developed areas such remote and mountainous areas, local 
community lacks these functions.  
    Equally important, the adoption of a number of macroeconomic policies have resulted 
in an alleviation of rural poverty by increasing higher incomes for poorer peasants. For instance, rural industrialization policy has induced a growth in the labour-intensive 
manufacturing sector that has generated employment in rural areas, and increased access 
to resources, credits, assets and services. And price policy--large increases in the 
purchase prices of major farm products--provides the material incentive for the expansion 
of agricultural economy, and increases the source of substantial gains in income for 
poorer peasants. But the farm price policy that is still too low. The low price creates 
difficulties for the poor and depresses their standard of living due to the continued 
existence of a "scissor gap",66  that is, an undervaluation of agricultural prices relative 
industrial prices.67  
    Moreover, the emphasis of anti-poverty policy has been switched from meeting basic 
human needs to redistribution with growth, which helps to reduce poverty effectively. 
Prior to 1979, China's anti-poverty policy emphasized meeting basic human needs, and 
was designed to satisfy the basic needs of the poor through government provision of 
commodities and services, subsidies, staple foods, water and sanitation, health care, 
primary and informal education, and housing. Now China's anti-poverty focus is 
redistribution with growth.68  Redistribution with growth (RWG) policies are designed to 
increase the productivity of low-income producers, improve their earning opportunities 
and ensure that they are supplied with the resources necessary to take advantage of these 
opportunities. RWG policies provide economic opportunities for the poor to improve 
their earning power by their own effort. This new emphasis derives from the view that 
basic needs are now fairly well satisfied in China, and that material incentives are needed 
to encourage economic effort and promote economic growth.69  
    Most importantly China has adopted specific anti-poverty policies targeted to 
particular groups and particular regions or areas in poverty. China recognizes that a 
broad-based economic growth strategy is not in itself sufficient to address poverty and 
that specific policies targeted to particular groups in poverty and particular areas or 
regions with a high incidence of poverty are needed. Anti-poverty policy designed to help 
Ningxia farmers escape poverty is an example. Since 1982, the Chinese government 
allocated 34 million yuan annually to help Xihaiyu, one of the three poorest areas in 
Ningxia province, to improve basic production conditions, and assist poverty-stricken 
households to raise cattle and develop others forms of sideline production. In addition, 
the government seeks international co-operation from the United Nations World Food 
Programme (WFP) and EC for the improvement of the ecological environment and the 
elimination of poverty.70  
    During the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-95), the Chinese government continues aid to 
poor areas, aimed at reducing the incidence of poverty in poor regions by increasing their 
level of production rather than by merely redistributing income. The plan also requires 
the more prosperous coastal regions to provide funds and technical and managerial 
personnel to help develop resources in poor areas. Assistance includes construction of 
farm buildings, increases in grain yields, additions to regional infrastructure and the 
"tapping" of natural resources.  
3.3 Education      Investment in human capital is one of the major determinants of sustainable human 
development. No country grows rapidly and sustainably without a highly literate labour 
force. Among all levels of education, primary and secondary education are most crucial. 
As the World Bank recently urged, the basic education of citizens "is critical for 
economic growth and poverty reduction, especially as labour market structures shift 
dramatically with changing technology and economic reform".71  In China's case, basic 
education contains the biggest failure story during the reform period.  
    In the field of education, the Chinese people have had a very unique experience. 
During the period of the Cultural Revolution (from 1966-1976), all colleges and 
universities were shut down; the examination system was abolished; the content of 
primary, secondary and high schools was political slogans and Marxist and Mao Zedong 
thoughts. People were discouraged from acquiring knowledge and skills. One of the 
results of the Cultural Revolution was the crushing of the education system. At least one-
third of employees held positions for which they had never had any training, while 
another third had had only indeterminate training. The illiteracy rate was estimated at 
more than 30 per cent.72  The correction of this serious distortion of education started in 
1978. On 22 December 1978, Chinese leaders, at the Third Plenary Session of the 
Eleventh Central Committee, launched economic reforms and educational reforms which 
were regarded as one of the strategic tasks for the modernization programme, based on 
recognition of the importance of improving the quality of China's workforce as a means 
to modernization. Since then, education development has been repeatedly stressed and a 
series of policies and regulations have been adopted to revive the education system. 
Fifteen years later, however, the situation in Chinese education is not as good as it was 
expected to be.  
    Many old problems have remained and new problems have emerged. First, there is a 
great shortage of education funds. In the fifteen years between 1978 and 1993, although 
educational funding increased considerably, as Table 24 suggests, it is still not sufficient. 
In 1993, the government budgetary education expenditure was 69 billion yuan, 9 times 
the 1978 figure. Another 10.5 billion yuan was invested from other sources, such as 
educational contributions and taxes from industrial enterprises, capital construction funds 
outside the plan, profits made by school-run and university-run enterprises and donations 
from individuals or collectives. Altogether education received about 79 billion yuan, 10 
times the 1978 figure. However, these funds could not cover all the necessary expenses. 
China has 220 million students at all levels. Average expenditure is therefore about 360 
yuan for each student. But in reality, more than 50 per cent of the budget is spent for the 
payroll of staff members in tertiary institutions, and more than 80 per cent covers the 
salaries of school teachers and other staff members. Very little money is left for 
expenditure on teaching activities. According to one survey reported in 1989, in some 
areas of the country there was only 5 yuan per student year for secondary schools and 
only 1 yuan per child year for primary schools.73  There was a shortage of 75 million 
square metres of school buildings and 13 million sets of school desks and chairs. In 
addition, 45 million square metres of school buildings which were in use were on the 
point of collapse. Many school did not have basic teaching equipment. Only 47 per cent 
of secondary schools and 6 per cent of primary schools were equipped with laboratories. Less than 10 per cent of primary and secondary schools were fully equipped according to 
teaching requirements.74  
    The second problem is one of the teaching staff. Many teachers have no incentive to 
stay in teaching and have been leaving their jobs. The teaching staff problem is mainly 
caused by two factors: teacher incomes and living conditions and social status. Although 
the government increased teachers' average annual salaries from 545 yuan in 1978 to 
3,278 yuan in 1993 and tried to improve their living conditions by providing more 
housing, teachers are still at the bottom of the social scale. According to the Statistical 
Yearbook of China 1994, their earnings in 1993 were higher than those of only two other 
groups: farmers (2,042 yuan) and wholesale workers (2,679 yuan). They are still in one 
of the country's worst paid groups, earning less than factory workers (3,348 yuan), 
excavation workers (3,711 yuan), construction workers (3,779 yuan), social services 
employees (3,588 yuan) and government agency employees (3,505 yuan). Due to 
financial difficulties, almost all local governments except Beijing and Tibet have been 
delaying teachers' salaries since 1992. By the end of 1993, a total of 309 million yuan 
was owed to teachers, mostly in rural areas. In terms of housing, they have much less 
living space than the standard number of square metres set by the government. For 
example, according to one survey, at the end of 1987 an average household in a higher 
education institution had 36.6 square metres of living space while the standard of square 
metres set by the government was 56. Some 29.7 per cent of tertiary teacher households 
were waiting for residences to get married or had no residence after getting married, and 
63.5 per cent of households were overcrowded or not up to the standard. The 1988 survey 
showed that primary and secondary school teachers in counties, towns and cities had only 
an average of 29.5 square metres per household, much less than the average of 42.2 
square metres per household in the urban population.  
    The third problem is a high drop-out rate of school children. In 1988, 4,280,000 
children dropped out of primary school, and the drop-out rate was 3.3 per cent. Some 
2,870,000 students dropped out of junior secondary schools, and the drop-out rate was 
6.9 per cent.75  The problem is even more serious in country areas, where one-fifth of 
school-age children are not at school, three times as many as in the cities. The Renmin 
Ribao reported that in 1987 there were over 2.7 million school-aged children who did not 
enter school and that 83 per cent of them were female, who tended to start school and 
dropped out later in large numbers. In Gansu, for example, 80 per cent of female students 
did not finish primary school in 1986, and most of them were from the country areas. 
Table 24 reveals this serious problem by giving recent data derived from the Fourth 
National Population Census of China in 1990. According to this data, 71,471,000 
children quit their studies, at a rate of about 17 per cent. It is reported that over 2 million 
new illiterates are added each year,76  and that China still had 259 million illiterates by 
1993.77  In this sense, at the beginning of 1989, Deng Xiaoping and other state leaders 
admitted that education had been the biggest failure of the decade.78  
    What has caused these problems? Some writers argue that education has never been 
given priority in China, which is the most basic cause for these problems.79  In fact, the 
Chinese leaders have repeatedly emphasized the importance of educational development for the success of economic development. On 20 October 1984, the Third Plenum of the 
Twelfth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party adopted a major decision on 
the economic reforms, in which educational development was stressed as one of the 
urgent strategic tasks. In May 1985, the Central Committee held a national conference on 
education. Deng Xiaoping, in his address to the conference, said the rationale for 
economic reform was that China's overall strength, as well as its economic growth, 
increasingly depended on the skill of its workers and the quality of its intellectuals. In his 
view, China must use every possible means to properly solve problems related to 
education even if it has to slow down the speed of development in other areas.80  In this 
meeting, a target of the introduction of a nine-year compulsory education programme was 
adopted by the National People's Congress. Similarly, in 1987, Premier Zhao Ziyang 
stressed the strategic role of education and the necessity of enhancing the education level 
for people. He said:  
    "the revitalization of the economy and indeed the progress of the whole society all 
depend  
    on improving the quality of the workforce and training large numbers of competent 
personnel.  
    Education is of fundamental importance to the fulfilment of our great long-range 
mission. We must  
    therefore continue to stress the strategic role of education and do a better job of tapping  
    intellectual resources".  
    More recently Chinese leaders have also placed greater priority on education. In 1993, 
a conference, the largest meeting of the National Education Work Conference was held 
jointly by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council 
since 1985. In that year, China adopted the Programme for the Reform and Development 
of Education. In 1994, the second largest meeting was held, focusing on the strategy of 
placing even greater priority on education, further implementation of the Programme for 
the Reform and Development of Education in China. At the 1994 conference, General 
Party Secretary Jiang Zemin emphasized the importance of elevating education to a 
strategic position and placing priority on the development of educational undertakings.81  
Recently, Jiang, at a conference on Science and Technology in Beijing held on May 
1995, stressed a new concept to "make the national prosperous through science and 
education."82  
    It seems true that Chinese leaders have a strong commitment to the crucial role of 
education. Then, what has caused the failure of the basic education system? First, the 
central government has partially retreated from primary education due to its de-emphasis 
on the importance of basic education and financial difficulty although it continues to 
make commitment to all levels of education. This has been decisive for the decline in 
enrolment of primary and secondary school. In May 1983 a circular of the State Council 
and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced that the goal of 
universal primary education could only be achieved by "walking on two legs".83  That 
means that each community should devise its own plan to achieve the state mandated 
goal. In 1984, a document issued by the State Council, Guofa No. 174 explicitly delegated financial responsibility for rural education to the government at Xiang level 84 
, and in subsequent provincial regulations it was stated that the state money would stop at 
the county level. The results have been higher charges for students and falling rates of 
completion of basic education in both urban and rural areas, as well as greater 
inequalities between villages of different income levels. Villages with strong collective 
economies or good ability to tax local enterprises charge parents the lowest fees. By 
contrast parents in areas with only average incomes and no profitable village enterprises 
find educational fees may take as much as 50 per cent of their disposable cash incomes, 
and those living in the truly impoverished areas find the costs totally beyond what they 
can afford.85  
    Second, the decentralized institutions are largely contributing to the problems of 
education. The May 1985 Central Committee decision to reform the educational structure 
which laid great stress on the reform of basic education--primary and junior secondary 
schools--emphasized strongly that the power for the administration of basic education 
belongs to local authorities. However, local leaders have not taken the improvement of 
basic education seriously since decentralization and decollectivization of the rural 
economy have reduced the ability of local communities to invest in education in many 
areas, especially in poorer areas. They do not take action against drop-outs and even 
break the law themselves by diverting educational funds.86  Some localities even occupy 
school buildings and students have to classes in old and poor buildings. Zhongguo Jiaoyu 
Bao reported in 1987 that the leaders of a village in Zhejiang Province sold the village's 
primary school building and students were forced to study in an old mill. The mill 
collapsed, six people were killed and 16 were injured.87  Such examples provide further 
evidence that in many areas local officials pay no attention to basic education.  
    Third, the policy that emphasizes money-making along with economic growth and 
encourages people to concentrate on what they can earn help to promote a high rate of 
school drop-outs. Many parents, especially in rural areas, keep their children fully 
engaged in productive labour, apprenticeships or other work. Some local enterprises run 
by townships, villages or private entrepreneurs, and businesses run by individuals violate 
the law and employ under-age workers. For example, one survey exposed that an 
enterprise in Shenzhen recruited 1024 teenage workers in one month in 1989 from Yulin 
area in Guanxi. Among them 556 were from secondary school and 468 from primary 
schools.88  In addition, from wage and income distribution policies, people do not see 
that education is closely related to more income and a better life.89  A survey in 
Shanghai revealed that in 1986, the average monthly income of professional and 
technical personnel was only 109.33 yuan, 23.39 yuan lower than the average monthly 
income of the wage earners of the city. Thus the view that it is better to start making 
money early than to have more education has become common. This problem is more 
serious in the countryside. Peasant parents do not see any benefit in sending their children 
to schools, especially children who have little chance to get into colleges, universities or 
vocational secondary schools. Thus they keep their children in activities of making 
money rather than getting education.      In order to solve the problems described above, several measures were adopted at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The first measure was to raise educational funds. Insufficient 
funding for education, which has dogged China's educational progress for many years, 
continues to be a major problem. The 1994 Conference called for the gradual 
establishment of a mechanism which combined the government, society and education, 
mobilized various social sectors to support educational undertakings, and encouraged 
society as a whole to raise funds for operating schools. Moreover, the Minister of the 
State Education Commission submitted a draft plan to the State Council for an increase in 
China's education funding. In addition, an educational trust and investment company, and 
a national education development foundation were set up to raise more money to build 
primary and secondary schools.90  The second measure is to further progress the concept 
of nine-year compulsory education. In the 1994 Conference, conferees agreed that, by the 
end of this century, the nine-year compulsory education will have been popularized in 
regions to some 85 per cent of the country's total population, and illiteracy will be 
eliminated among 95 per cent of the country's young and middle-aged people. On the 
basis of popularizing nine-year compulsory education, vigorous development of 
vocational education in line with actual conditions in China are an effective way to train 
large numbers of urgently needed personnel. After having successfully completed the 
three education levels--primary, junior or senior middle schools--students will be 
encouraged to enter vocational education institutions. The third measure is to conduct 
other social policy reform to solve educational problems. Teachers' wage reform will 
boost their income to at least the level of local officials and severe punishment will be 
imposed on those who delay paying teachers' salaries.91  Moreover, the State Education 
Commission and the Finance Ministry has stated their intention to collect education taxes 
from social services and exempt school-run factories from taxes.  
    As a result, it is reported that compulsory education in rural areas and adult illiteracy 
has improved. In a Beijing news conference on March 14, 1995, the State Education 
Commission Minister said that 98 per cent of the school-age children in China were at 
school, with a subsequent drop-out rate of just 2 per cent, but the average drop-out rate in 
the countryside stood at 3 per cent. According to his announcement, by the year 2000, 
China will reach its twin target of extending nine-year compulsory education to 85 per 
cent of the population and eliminating illiteracy among citizens aged 15-45 in the areas 
where 90 per cent of the national population lives. The goal is to bring illiteracy down to 
below 5 per cent on average.  
3.4 Health services  
    During the pre-reform era, China produced an exceptional health care system--a 
primary network of the health services--which had been established in both rural and 
urban areas. In particular, the stress on health work in rural areas had brought a great 
change in their previously underprivileged situation since the Co-operative Medical 
Service (CMS) was introduced in 1968. For about a decade it provided a low-cost form of 
community financing for rural health services, in which, peasants paid a per capita sum of 
1 yuan which was matched by a similar sum from the production brigade and paid to the 
commune. In this scheme, some 85 per cent of brigades were covering 76 per cent of China's rural population in 1975. Moreover, there was a great improvement in access of 
the rural population to health services. In each of the around 2000 counties, a hospital 
(with average 120 beds), an epidemic prevention station and a maternal and child health 
care centre had been established; and in each of the approximately 50,000 townships a 
health centre had been set up (with, on average, more than 10 beds). There were also 
more than 500,000 co-operative health centres scattered throughout the villages. The 
number of medical and health personnel had gradually increased. At the end of 1977, 
there were in all some 1,700,000 regular hospital beds--26 times the total number of beds 
in pre-liberation days.92  
    In addition to the advantages of cheapness and the provision of basic and easily 
accessible service, the system had a number of structural drawbacks. The most apparent 
of them was the tendency to overspend, their small scale and local accountability, bad 
quality of care, etc. Thus, the CMS began to decline before economic reforms were 
instituted in China. By 1980, 68.6 per cent of brigades were in the system, by 1981 that 
number was 58.2 per cent. By 1991, it was reported that co-operative health care in the 
countryside had come to exist only name, and no longer in reality, and that the ratio of 
co-operative health care and medicine has dropped from 80 per cent in the past to 5 per 
cent.93  
    There are disparities and inequalities in the availability of national health services 
among different population groups. Compared to the rural population, the urban 
population enjoys a better health service. National health insurance is only available for 
cadres and health coverage only for employees of state work units which only account for 
around 10 per cent of the population. Health services are characterized by costly and 
sophisticated services that are provided to a small number of population groups, leaving 
fewer resources for the rest of the population. In 1981, national health services only 
covered 18 million people but cost 789 million yuan. In 1985, they covered 21.2 million 
people at a cost of 1.5 billion. In 1986, they covered 23 million people, costing 1.9 billion 
yuan. Now the cost has become even higher because people are living longer and the 
number of retired persons entitled to benefits has risen. Costs for those currently in 
employment stood at 16 billion yuan in 1990, and 18.8 billion yuan in 1991.94  By 
contrast, with the exception of a small number of developed regions where there is still 
some measure of planned medical care, the vast majority of peasants today need to pay 
for medical care out of their own pockets.  
    Inequity in health status between the "haves" and "have-nots" can also be found in 
other indicators. According to The State of the World's Children 1995, in 1988-1993, 
about 60 per cent of rural population and 99 per cent of urban population had access to 
clean and safe water; only 3 per cent of rural population while 58 per cent of urban 
population had access to adequate sanitation; and 88 per cent of rural population and 100 
per cent of urban population had access to health services.95  The rural population had 
less access to hospital facilities as well. In 1991, the number of hospital beds per 
thousand people was only 1.6 in the countryside, which is 2.6 less than the 4.2 hospital 
beds available to each thousand people in urban areas. There were only 0.97 doctors for 
each thousand people in the countryside, which is 1.9 fewer than the 2.9 per thousand in the cities. It is clear that there is still a significant discrepancy in the level of health 
service and medical care available to the urban and rural population.  
    The major reason for this problem is that the central government reduced commitment 
to widespread health services. In March 1985, the Ministry of Civil Affairs authorized 
each province to assume responsibility for welfare polices and programmes that had 
previously been held by the central government.96  Guofa No. 45 in June 1986 and 
Guofa No. 64 in August of the same year completed the transformation of rural relief. By 
this major policy shift, the central government retreated from the basic administrative and 
financial supports of rural health care system. In order to open up rural access to a variety 
of health enterprises, the government allowed various types of ownership of health 
facilities to flourish, including private clinics and hospitals, private practitioners. Private 
practitioners were given legal status as early as 1980, and by 1982 a pluralistic health 
care system was being established in rural areas. But the result of the reform is not very 
satisfactory for the rural population. The Chinese government admitted that the health 
reforms and collapse of the CMS led to a decline in health standards and health work of 
rural areas. State Council Document No, 4 of 1991 referred to the consequences of the 
reform plan in its foreword: "During health reform we ignored the support of rural health 
work. Investment for health care was reduced; the lower levels of the health care system 
in the towns and villages were severely hit. The CMS disappeared. Medical prices 
increased without regulation and we could not control private doctors. Rural residents 
could not afford medical care and diseases which had disappeared appeared again and the 
gap between the rural and urban areas increased."97  
    The Chinese experience with the reform of the health services system teaches us the 
following lessons: First, government should consistently endorse health-for-all policy, 
and at the same time collect enough resources to guarantee funds for health care for all 
people. There is clearly a recognition that funds need to be set aside for planning the 
provision of services rather than simply letting them emerge or disappear in response to 
market demand. By imposing great restrictions on free health care for government 
employees, the government should take the steps towards retaining resources which can 
be redirected towards the rural sector and using scarce capital to improve the supply of 
health services and bureaucratic monitoring and regulation to prevent health care costs 
from spiralling out of control. It is reported that a programme of health-for-all leadership 
development has been undertaken in a number of provinces of China where special 
emphasis is placed on promoting primary health care to a wide inter-sectoral audience.98  
    Second, community involvement is important to develop rural medical and health 
services systems. Community involvement is defined as a process whereby communities, 
families and individuals assume responsibility for their own health and welfare and 
develop the capacity to contribute to their own and the community's development.99  In 
the 1960s and 1970s the success of most village level aid to families in difficulty or to 
Five Guarantee Households of childless elderly had depended primarily on the quality of 
village leadership and the cohesion of the community, and only secondarily on absolute 
levels of wealth.100  Thus, in any areas where village leaders are able to maintain local 
welfare services, community involvement is successful, and where decollectivization significantly weakens the commitment or ability of village-level leaders to maintain local 
welfare services, the quality of programmes will decline.  
3.5 Economic Security  
    The well-being of an individual can be affected by the degree of economic security. 
For example, inflation and unemployment could threaten the well-being of an individual 
since both lead to a substantial decline in real income. Table 25 presents money supply 
and inflation rates. Such data shows that China had little or no open inflation before the 
reforms, and after the introduction of market-orientation the average annual increase in 
prices was significantly more than that of the pre-reform period. Inflation is created by an 
excessive rate of increase in China's money supply by 20 to 30 per cent per year. In fact, 
it is generally agreed that the official rice indexes tend to underestimate the true rate of 
inflation so it may have been even higher in recent years than is suggested by these 
figures. The greater price instability is a manifestation of the growing difficulties 
experienced by the government in achieving a balance between aggregate demand and 
supply under increased decentralization and marketization of the economy.  
    As for unemployment, with the demise of rural communes, the abandonment of 
guaranteed state jobs and the introduction of a contract worker system in the cities, job 
insecurity has increased in recent years. The relatively large amount of disguised 
unemployment has also diminished and contributed to the growing number of 
unemployed. Chinese scholars believe that the real surplus population in agriculture by 
the end of the century may amount to 310 million working-age adults, of whom rural 
enterprises will be able to absorb about 180 million, leaving another 130 million as 
potential migrants to the cities. Combined with natural population increase in the cities, 
the need to create one hundred million new urban jobs during the 1990s appears to be a 
quite conservative estimate.101  
    The growing number of unemployed is partly caused by institutional change from the 
planned economy to a market economy. The transition to a market economy involves 
three main elements: (1) transforming enterprises into market-oriented organizations, 
which are responsible for their profits and losses and which may disappear due to 
bankruptcy or mergers; (2) giving employees and employers the power to terminate 
employment; and (3) leaving the markets to determine prices. These transitional changes 
are crucial for the development of a well-functioning market economy, but they also 
adversely affect social and economic security such as job guarantee, life-time 
employment and the provision of daily necessities and housing at low prices enjoyed by 
the urban population.102  A fully-developed market economy will bring in the following 
changes: job guarantees will disappear because the government will not be able to 
provide the same type of job guarantee; life-time employment will no longer exist since 
universal life-time employment is not consistent with market-oriented enterprises; and 
homelessness could be a problem when house rents are raised to market levels. In 
contrast to those in a planned economy, the Chinese government in a market economy 
has a limited capacity to prevent unemployment, inflation and homelessness. On the one hand, it has to further open the job market to provide wider access to employment. On the 
other hand, it has to deal with these problems through the social security system.  
    Local governments have incentives to deal with these problems. They feel they must 
create new jobs rapidly to maintain social stability since hundreds of millions of people 
either enter the urban labour force or seek to shift from farm to non-farm jobs. To meet 
the tremendous pressures in local areas for new jobs, they intend to maximize the speed 
of the economic growth. Combatting unemployment in Shanghai is a very good example. 
Shanghai launched a major programme to find jobs for 385,000 unemployed people after 
staff were made redundant when the municipal government introduced a modern 
enterprises system in November 1994. The Trade Union and the Women's Federation of 
the city played an important role in getting the project into operation. More than 50,000 
jobless people have now been employed by some 4,000 enterprises established by the 
municipal Trade Union, and 7,800 have found jobs with the help of 15 vocational training 
agencies under the direction of the municipal union. The city's Women's Federation has 
also helped to engage a number of retrained female textile workers in the civil aviation 
industry, and others in the subway services. Now, there are 19 vocational training centres 
in Shanghai. About 249,000 people trained there have found new jobs.103  
    China plans to hold the country's urban unemployment rate below 3 per cent by 
launching a series of programmes to address the surplus labour problem in the cities. 
According to the Labour Minister, the planned programmes include setting up more 
profitable small enterprises to increase employment opportunities for newly increased 
urban labour and a re-employment project to provide jobs for surplus workers from state-
owned enterprises. China expects to see a sharp growth in the unemployment rate as it 
adopted a major reform to invigorate state enterprises. The State Planning Commission 
estimates that about 20 million redundant workers will be shed from state enterprises 
over the next five years and that 120 million more will leave rural areas seeking work in 
the cities.  
    In addition, the government has taken steps to deal with China's 100 million redundant 
rural work-force who travel around the country seeking jobs. On the one hand, China 
encourages more township enterprises to absorb the local redundant labourers; on the 
other hand, migrant labourers are required to obtain an "employment card" from their 
hometown and to receive an "employment permit" from the region they travel to before 
they are allowed to take a job.104  
3.6 Social security system  
    Before reform, the special feature of the Chinese social security system was its 
function as a safety-net at a basic and low level. In the China cities, the danwei (unit, the 
employing enterprise or institution) took care of urban workers with Labour Insurance, a 
social security scheme introduced shortly after the establishment of the PRC for urban 
state employees (including old age, work accident and health provisions and a range of 
social services).      By the end of the 1970s, the social security system in urban areas included the 
following programme: (1) The government had kept a high employment rate. In the 
planned economy, the government controlled employment as well as every aspect of the 
economy. The problem of large visible unemployment did not exist in Chinese cities.105  
(2) The government controlled and kept prices for necessary goods such as grain, cloth 
and cooking oil low. (3) Labour insurance was available to fixed staff and workers 
employed in state enterprises, including pensions, free medical care, paid sick leave and 
maternity leave, occupational and non-occupational injury and disability benefits, and 
coverage of funeral expenses. Employees in some collective enterprises were entitled to 
similar benefits, but mostly at a lower level. And (4) there were urban relief programme 
for poor people, whose income was below the minimum living standard, the disabled or 
elderly widows who had no family support, and orphans.  
    In rural areas, the social security system included the programme as follows: (1) The 
rural population had access to agricultural land after they were organized into people's 
communes. (2) The rural collective organizations provided most welfare for the rural 
population. The Five Guarantee system, one of the welfare programmes, ensured food, 
clothing, fuel, housing and funeral expenses for elderly who had neither working ability 
nor family support. And the rural co-operative medical care system, another welfare 
programme, existed from the mid-1960 to the early 1980s. (3) The government provided 
poor relief programmes in rural areas, in some areas with bad natural conditions, or 
certain areas in a bad year, the government could agree to exemption from agricultural 
taxes. For extremely poor areas or in cases of natural disaster the government could 
provide subsidies.  
    The social security system has shortages. An obvious gap existed between different 
social groups: urban and rural residents. The former had higher incomes and better 
welfare provisions than the latter. The difference also existed between the employees in 
state enterprises and other employees in urban areas. The former had stable employment, 
pensions, free medical access, family hardship benefits, low-cost housing, etc., while 
other employees were entitled to unstable benefits from the collective economy or no 
benefits at all. In addition, the social security system is harmful to economic efficiency. 
The benefits in the state sector were mainly arranged by the central government, thus 
every enterprise could maintain a standard level without considering economic 
efficiency. It provided no incentive for people, especially those of the state enterprises, to 
work hard, and some call it the cradle of laziness.  
    After the economic reforms were introduced, the situation in almost all respects 
influenced the social security system. It became less and less suitable, and more social 
problems are appearing. First of all, along with the rapid development of the collective 
and the individual (self-employed) economies, the lack of social security benefits in these 
economies has become an increasing social problem. Secondly, employment in state 
enterprises is no longer stable after the employment system reform was introduced. With 
the reform of the employment system in 1986, almost all new employees in state 
enterprises have become "contract workers". Moreover, bankruptcy has become possible 
for all enterprises, which may create a higher rate of unemployment. Thirdly, the traditional pattern of land security is losing its hold in rural areas.106  Many young 
farmers, who are attracted by the development of rural enterprises, are leaving the land to 
work in local factories, and the management of the land is gradually being concentrated 
among small groups of people. Consequently, some might become landless.  
    The purpose of the reform of social security system is to create a more efficient one 
with higher effects and lower costs. In some cities, a social security programme for the 
self-employed is offered by the People's Insurance Company of China. Collective 
enterprises adopt various insurance programmes: some of them get benefits from the 
"mother organization"; others adopt the social insurance system; a third type is the social 
insurance arrangement with the People's Insurance Company of China. In the 
countryside, the reform of the social security system can be summarized as follows: The 
Five Guarantee system is maintained but not supported by the production team any more. 
A unified financing system at the village or a higher level to maintain basic social 
security benefits is established, and old peoples' homes are built. Pension insurance 
programmes in some richer villages are established, but are not very stable. New 
programmes such as a medical care programme, a unified medical care system and a 
health insurance programmes have been put into practice in several economically 
developed areas. But in most of the poor villages, the absence of medical care 
programmes is an unsolved problem. Social insurance programmes are developed in 
several areas. Experimenting by villages with social insurance projects in order to deal 
with natural disasters is encouraged. In some projects, the peasants are compensated for 
losses by an insurance foundation subsidized by the government. In general, it has 
become a common consensus that the rural social insurance, governmental relief 
programmes, locally financed subsidies and traditional functions must be combined to 
create an efficient social security system.  
    Recently, reform of China's social security system has made the following new 
achievements on old-age and unemployment insurance: first, with regard to the reform of 
the old-age pension system, the socialized management of pensions has been introduced 
to all state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises in 2,024 cities and counties. In 
addition, old-age insurance is being expanded to employees of foreign-funded and private 
enterprises, as well as self-employed individuals. At present, 87.5 million employees and 
20.32 million retirees 107  have participated in the programme involving the socialized 
management of retirement pay, a system under which employees pay a prescribed portion 
of the premiums. Individuals pay premiums equivalent to 2-3 per cent of their salaries, 
with the rate in some large cities such as Beijing and Tianjin, set at 4-5 per cent. Second, 
by the end of 1994, the unemployment insurance programme had covered 95 million 
employees. That same year, over 1.87 million unemployed workers received relief funds, 
with the number equalling the total for the previous seven years. Some 1.06 million 
unemployed workers were re-employed after completing retraining programmes or 
entering into private businesses. In addition, unemployment insurance institutions nation-
wide issued lump-sum subsidies to 3.6 million employees of enterprises facing great 
financial difficulty. Some localities have used a portion of their unemployment premiums 
to help enterprises provide new arrangements for redundant workers. Third, with regard 
to reform of the medical-care insurance system, a number of units under the direct control of the State Council have gone into operation, following completion of planning and 
promotion activities. Reform has yielded gratifying results in reducing medical expenses 
and ensuring basic medical services. Significant progress has also been made in 
universalizing the socialized management of medical expenses for retirees and employees 
afflicted with serious diseases. The programme currently covers 5 million employees in 
more than 380 cities and counties, and 500,000 retirees in 225 cities and counties. Fourth, 
in terms of industrial injury insurance, pilot projects for the socialized management of 
industrial injury payments based on a floating rate have been launched in 868 cities and 
counties throughout the country. Last, with regard to child-bearing insurance for 
enterprise employees socialized management of the child-bearing fund has been 
introduced to 539 cities and counties nation-wide.108  
3.7 Environmental issues  
    Before 1979, in giving priority to heavy industry development, China under Mao 
created a system of strong industrial ministries and central planning. Each of these 
emphasized physical output targets and environmental issues received no attention. These 
industrial ministries and the State Planning Commission did not consider the 
environmental results of the construction of new plants. As a consequence, heavily 
polluting steel and chemical industries were developed in areas such as Beijing's suburbs 
to the west and north. In Shanghai, the city's major effluent discharge pipe was placed 
right alongside the major intake pipe that provided the bulk of the city's water supply. 
The poverty in the countryside also contributed to environmental damage. In order to 
obtain adequate fuel, most peasants resorted to gleaning forest floors for twigs, leaves 
and other flammable material for cooking and heating. Such activities reduced the quality 
of forests by preventing the cycles of decay and nourishment of soil that would normally 
occur.  
    Since 1979, reform and growth have had a mixed impact on the environment. There 
has been some increased incentive to use resources wisely, thus limiting environmental 
damage; some elements of growth have sharply escalated environmental damage. For 
example, current industrial policy that has shifted focus from heavy industry to light 
industry has a basically beneficial effect on the use of resources per unit of output. 
However, other aspects of reform and growth have accelerated the deterioration of the 
environment. In the countryside, the break up of people's communes and the resulting 
movement of large numbers of farmers off the land has had various negative 
environmental consequences; and the development of a large number of township 
enterprises helps produce some environmental damage because some of these enterprises 
are concentrated in polluting industries. In cities, pro-consumption policies are beginning 
to produce the consequences of a consumer society. The number of vehicles is expanding 
rapidly, with related contribution to air and noise pollution. The World Health 
Organization considers 60 to 90 micrograms per cubic metre (mcg/m(3) of suspended 
particulate matter an acceptable range. The average total of suspended particulate matter 
in north China in the 1980s was 520 mcg/m(3), and in south China the figure was 318 
mcg/m(3). These are among the highest readings in the world.109      Recently, environmental issues have been put on the national agenda. In introducing 
China's Ten-Year Programme for National Economic and Social Development (1991-
2000), Premier Li Peng pointed to the necessity for China to give greater attention to 
environmental protection. And local people's congresses have in some instances heard 
popular pleas for greater attention to environmental protection.110  In practice, the state 
provides funding for environmental protection, which has resulted in large state-owned 
factories obtaining funds for investment in environmental protection, e.g. the purchase of 
pollution-reducing equipment. Although pollution control laws are not always enforced, 
there are cases in China where the polluter-pays principle has been successfully applied. 
When the market system is advanced in China, it is possible that the polluter-pays 
principle may also become more widely imposed and implemented. 111  China experts 
reported that the country is seriously examining marketable pollution rights as a possible 
means of controlling industrial pollution in Shanghai and Shenyang Cities.112  In 
general, China's reform effort has started to lead to more environmentally friendly 
approaches to development.  
    Other China experts believe that China as of the mid-1990s faces environmental 
problems that have worsened significantly since the start of reform due to the fact that the 
country lost one-third of its mature forests from 1982 to 1989, and that arable land 
diminished by 0.5 per cent per year.113  If China does not adopt efficient measures to 
solve its environmental problem, the 1990s are likely to be seen as the Decade of 
Accelerated Environmental Degradation, while environmental degradation, in turn, could 
conceivably force serious declines in the predicted growth rate for the economy.114  
   
4. Conclusion  
    With good subsequent economic growth during the pre-reform era, China's human 
development in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, income distribution, reduction 
of poverty, etc. had seen great improvement since the establishment of the PRC. 
However, its achievements were flawed by the serious absence of such essential human 
choices as political and economic freedom. The economic reform since 1979 has 
tremendously increased the Chinese people's economic choices, but the development of 
other elements of human development such as basic education and health care has 
stagnated.  
    This mixed performance of human development can be explained by the change from 
highly centralized institutions to decentralized institutions, unbalanced effects of reform 
policies, and governance with increased corruption and reduced state commitment 
towards improving the well-being of the poor. In the decentralized institutions, the central 
government is unable to provide enough basic health-care and primary education due to 
its own weak capability to mobilize resources, while local governments are likely to 
ignore issues of education and health due to lack of commitment and incapability. Market 
institutions adversely affect these social issues while social institutions are still too weak 
to play an important role in the provision of basic education and health services. In this 
regard, although the decentralized institutions have brought great opportunities to the Chinese people for higher economic growth, their undeveloped aspects seriously impede 
the translation of growth to human development.  
    The reform policies have unbalanced impacts. Decollectivization has released peasants' 
incentives and significantly improved agricultural performance, but increased difficulty 
for the poor to access basic social services. Rural industrialization, that was designed 
with the intent to generate employment, making China able to absorb a large amount of 
the surplus labour, has had few negative impacts on human progress except for its the 
affect on the environment. By contrast, fiscal policy that places a smaller share of central 
government expenditure on the social sectors has had a destructive impact on education 
and health care. In areas where the market fails, the state fails to resume the leadership; as 
a result, social progress has slowed down.  
    The quality of governance of China has been negatively affected by the lack of 
accountability and transparency and by reduced state commitment towards improving the 
well-being of the poor. As a result of the lack of accountability, corruption is significantly 
increasing with negative impact on income distribution and social welfare. The lack of 
transparency makes Chinese people unable to have freedom of speech, press and 
assembly, and unable to develop stable means of political participation.  
    With increased economic growth, the Chinese people's economic choices have been 
greatly increased. However, the undeveloped parts of institutions, negative effects of 
reform policies and governance with increased corruption and reduced commitment 
towards improved well-being of the poor that impede the complete translation from 
economic growth to human development should not be ignored. The failure of basic 
education and the reduced success of primary health services suggest that the central 
government should not retreat from the basic administrative and financial supports of 
basic education and a rural health-care system. It should consistently endorse education-
for-all and health-for-all policy, and collect enough resources to guarantee the funds for 
basic education and health care for all people, especially for the poor.  
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